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Abstract  
 
 
This paper not only considers the regulatory challenges faced by regulators, but also the              
potential of responsive regulation and particularly meta regulation to address these           
challenges. It explores developments which have necessitated a change from the traditional            
form of regulation, that is, command and control regulation to more responsive hybrids of              
regulation. Even though traditional regulation has its advantages, its inability to address the             
demands of changing business environments has resulted in the adoption of more flexible             
forms of regulation such as risk based regulation and responsive regulation. Whilst the             
potential of responsive regulation is considered, the complexities and challenges faced by            
the regulator in identifying and assessing risk, solutions aimed at countering problems of risk              
regulation, along with the problems arising from different perceptions of risk will be addressed              
only briefly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responsive Regulation: Achieving the Right Balance Between 
Persuasion and Penalisation 
Marianne Ojo  1
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The challenges faced by regulators inter alia include the difficulties in addressing the problem              
of uncertainty generated by non prescriptive rules. Such uncertainty, as highlighted by            
Haines, regarding the required level of minimum compliance could result in some            2
companies going beyond what is actually required in complying with such rules. Further, in              
their view, a consequence of the uncertainties regarding what is required by the law and the                
strong incentive to ensure compliance, which includes increased penalties, is evidenced by            
the difficulty in distinguishing between “beyond compliance” and “over compliance”.          3
According to Gunningham and Johnstone, the encouragement given to organizations to go            
beyond strict legal requirements, constitutes an important benefit of more flexible and less             
prescriptive models of regulation. Gunningham also asserts that the unsatisfactory          4
performance of both direct government regulation and market deregulation has compelled a            
review of present regulatory strategies, hence resulting in an experimentation with alternative            
mechanisms such as economic instruments, self-regulation, co regulation and a range of            
information based strategies. In his opinion, the design of a “third phase” of regulation, one               5
which still involves government intervention, but selectively and in addition to a range of              
market and non market solutions, will be required in order to address the inefficiencies of               
traditional regulation, on hand, and the flaws inherent in deregulation on the other hand.   6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 ​Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North West University, Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2 ​See F Haines and D Gurney ‘ Regulatory Compliance: The Problems and Possibilities in Generic Models of                  
Regulation’ in ’Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance’ R Johnstone and R Sarre (eds) (2004) Research and               
Public Policy Series No 57 at page 24 
3 ​ibid at page 24; also see BH Kobayashi ‘Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the                  
Antitrust Laws Against Corporations’ (2001) George Washington Law Review 69 (6) 715-744  
4 ​N Gunningham and R Johnstone Regulating Workplace Safety: Systems and Sanctions 1999 Oxford: Oxford               
University Press at page 35  
5 N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : Clarendon               
Press at page 35  
6 ​ibid at page 10 
 
 
Interactions Between States and Markets  
 
Legal regulation  
 
According to Lange, the occurrence of interactions between states and markets does not             
take place in a vacuum. Such interactions, in her opinion, not only determine the position               7
assumed by legal regulation - the characterisation of different types of law has occurred on               
the basis of reference to the their "location in space". Legal pluralism, which is generally               8
perceived to be a prominent form in globalisation, refers to “geographical or metaphorical             
notions of space in its conception of law.” In her opinion, a consideration of legal regulation                9
as state-market interactions simply does not generate analytical questions which relate to the             
nature of these interactions, but also prescriptive questions, namely, the degree of state             
intervention and market ordering required for the facilitation of effective regulation.  10
 
In linking legal responsibilities and legal regulation to Carroll’s pyramid of Corporate Social             
Responsibility, should failure to comply with so called overburdensome rules which restrict            11
an enterprise’ revenue and income generating capacity be justified in the quest to attain              
economic goals and objectives of profit maximisation? 
 
Measures were imposed on the provision of certain categories of Non Audit Services,             
pursuant to section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act - following the collapse of Enron. However                
based on a recent report by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a growing              12
rate of increase in consulting revenue and acquisition activity by firms over the past several               
years, was observed. It was also reported that consulting revenue for the Big Four global               
network firms increased over the past five years (prior to 2013), by 33% against only 6% of                 
audit revenue. 
 
Such figures clearly indicate that audit firms have placed economic responsibilities above            
their legal responsibilities and it is also quite understandable why safeguards aimed at             
ensuring that audit independence and objectivity are complied with, will be compromised.            
Such ethical codes relating to objectivity, independence are more likely to be compromised             
where excessive reliance is placed on revenue generated from other non audit incomes             
relative to that generated from audit income. 
 
Changes in state-market relationships are highlighted as being reflected through: Gradually           
blurred lines between states and markets, which is attributed to the privatization of states and               
the dominance of markets by powerful corporate actors. It is added further, that in response               13
7 ​B Lange ‘Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction’ Sage Publications (2003)12 (4) 413 
8 ​ibid 
9 ​ibid at page 414 
10  ​ibid at 416  
11 ​See AB Carroll, “The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of 
Organizational Stakeholders” Business Horizons, July - August 1991 at page 4 
12 ​See PCAOB, “Statement on Proposed 2014 Budget and Strategic Plan” Nov 2013  
13 ​See B Lange ‘Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction’ Sage Publications (2003) 12 (4) 413 
to changing state-market relationships, modern forms of legal regulation have developed.           14
The privilege of the inclusion of state-economy interactions in considering legal regulation            
derives from the definition of legal regulation, which can be defined as the regulation of               
economic activities.  15
 
Hence does the flexibility provided to directors and management to override legal and ethical              
responsibilities, serve as justifiable means of attaining economic responsibilities - as well as             
an effective deterrent to certain culpable corporate actions? 
 
 
“Decentring regulation” is used by Black to express the notion that governments should not              
and do not have a monopoly on regulation and that regulation is now being carried out by                 
other actors namely: large organisations, collective associations, professions, technical         
committees etc without government's involvement or even formal approval. Decentring is           16
also considered to refer to changes occurring within government and administration : the             
internal fragmentation of the tasks of policy formation and implementation. Self-regulation           17
fits into this analysis because it is a form of 'decentred' regulation as it is not state regulation.                 
 18
 
Enforced Self Regulation  
 
The responsive approach (to regulation) proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite involves a            
process whereby regulators proceed with compliance based strategies and then resort to            
more punitive “deterrents” where the desired level of compliance is not achieved. In their              19
opinion, this is a more preferable option to the positions supported either by those who               
believe that “gentle persuasion works in securing business compliance with the law” and             20
those who only consider that corporations would only comply with the law where tough              
sanctions were applied. Greater regulatory challenges, in their view, were to be found, not at               
the apex of the pyramid of regulatory strategies, nor at the base of the pyramid, but at the                  
intermediate levels of the pyramid of regulatory strategies and such intermediate sections,            
thus, were in greatest need of regulatory innovation.   21
 
With the responsive approach, it is assumed that regulation would always commence at the              
base of the pyramid. According to Ayres and Braithwaite, the Enforced Self-Regulation Model             
is not just: 
14 ​ibid 
15 ​See S Picciotto ‘Introduction: Reconceptualizing Regulation in the Era of Globalization’ in D Campbell and S                 
Picciotto (eds) ‘New Directions in Regulatory Theory’, special issue of the Journal of Law and Society 29(1) 1-11 
16 ​J Black, 'Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post –                
Regulatory' World (2001) in M. Freeman (ed.) 103 
17 Ibid p 104 
18 Ibid p 113 
19 ​ I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995) Oxford: 
Social Legal Studies at page 101 
20 ​ibid at page 20  
21 ​ibid at page 101. “A range of certified punitive strategies exist at the apex of the pyramid whilst experience of 
the successes and failures of the free market and of self regulation (aimed at protecting consumers) can be found 
at the base of the pyramid”, ibid 
 
- a form of responsive regulation whereby negotiation occurs between the state and the             
individual firms to establish regulations that are particularized to each firm. In the             22
Enforced Self-regulation Model, each firm is required to propose its own regulatory            
standards in order to avoid harder (and less tailored) standards imposed by the state.             
 This individual firm is “enforced” in two senses :  23 24
 
Under the Enforced Self Regulation Model put forward by Ayres and Braithwaite, they             
highlight that the firm is firstly required by the State to do the self-regulation. Second, the                
privately written rules can be publicly enforced. Governments are advised to resort to             
“command regulation with non-discretionary punishment” only after having considered, firstly,          
the provision of solutions which are self regulatory to industries, and where the relevant goals               
were not achieved under this option, the subsequent adoption of a more rigorous approach of               
“command regulation with discretionary punishment” through enforced self regulation. As a           25
result of the susceptibility of states to capture and corrupt related activities in business, it is of                 
immense importance for third parties, non government organisations particularly, to be           
directly involved in the oversight of regulatory enforcement. As well as this function of acting               26
as a safeguard against the capture of state regulators, non government organisations can             
also directly regulate businesses themselves through schemes which they oversee.          27
Responsive regulation considers the role of non government organisations as regulators to            
be so fundamentally important, in the same way that businesses play a vital role as               
regulators – as well as regulatees.   28
 
Distinguishing Between the Principal Agent Theory and the Stakeholder Theory 
 
To the effect that corporate and firm goals are not merely restricted to the goal of profit                 
maximisation - as evident under the traditional principal agent theory model, but that such              
goals also embrace the goals of stakeholder protection and the realisation of responsibilities             
owed towards such broader stakeholders, 
 
economic responsibilities should be accorded less pre eminence under the stakeholder           
theory than is the case under the traditional principal agent theory whilst legal and ethical               
responsibilities should be accorded nearly the same status with economic responsibilities - in             
order of priority and importance, under the stakeholder theory and concept of corporate social              
responsibility. 
 
 
22 ​ibid p 101 
23 ​ibid 
24 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995) Oxford: Social 
Legal Studies at page 101 
25 ​R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 5 
26 ​See J Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies’ (2006) World Development Volume 34 
No 5 at page 888 
27 ​ibid; also see Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, chapter 3 
28  ibid  
Furthermore, a model of Corporate Social Responsibility - one which requires and compels             
directors and management to comply with legal and ethical responsibilities whilst executing            
economic objectives, would not only serve as a more effective mechanism in terms of              
facilitating greater compliance, but also one which deters them from engaging in self dealing              
and serving inclined activities - whilst facilitating the ultimate goal to wider stakeholders as              
well as philanthropic responsibilities. 
 
Achieving Greater Compliance  Under the Pyramid of Regulatory Strategies  
 
Although the ‘pyramid of regulatory strategies’ is directed at individual regulated firms, a             
parallel approach is applied by Ayres and Braithwaite to entire industries.   29
 
Enforced self regulation was not only proposed as a means of striking a balance between the                
advocates of “gentle persuasion” works best and those who favour tougher measures, but             
also considered to be of greatest need at the intermediate levels of the pyramid of regulatory                
strategies. In striking this balance between compliance and enforcement measures, Ayres           30
and Braithwaite contribute to resolving regulatory difficulties faced by regulators, of when best             
to apply either compliance or punitive measures, and in situations where the use of              
excessive punitive deterrent measures could conceal harsh treatment of less significant           
regulatees. According to Baldwin and Black, Ayres and Braithwaite acknowledge the possible            
difficulties of moving down the regulatory pyramid since relationships between regulators and            
regulatees, which are foundations for less punitive strategies, could be influenced through the             
application of overly punitive sanctions. Furthermore, ‘voluntary’ compliance at the base of            31
the pyramid could be rendered extremely difficult as a result of constant threat of punitive               
measures at the top.   32
 
Further criticisms, in Baldwin and Black’s view, directed at the pyramid approach, in addition              
to the above mentioned criticism, can be classified into three groups, namely, “the policy” or               
“conceptual”, “the practical” and “the constitutional”. Legal problems which exist in applying            33
a responsive approach, it is further added, may arise from the fact some legislatures may               
have stipulated deterrence procedures which may leave little scope for the enforcement            
agency in adopting such an approach. Furthermore, responsive regulation would be difficult            34
to implement in corrupt societies since it encourages situations whereby discretion is given             
to bureaucrats who may exploit such discretion for purposes aimed at promoting their own              
interests. The incentive structures which exist within a firm become very crucial in issues              35
29 ​R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 5 
30 ​Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation at page 101 
31  ​R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 6 
32 ​ibid 
33 ​R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 6 and for further criticisms, see ibid. 
34 ​ibid at page 9 
35 ​See J Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies’ (2006) World Development Volume 34 
No 5 at page 896  
involving voluntary or involuntary compliance. Whilst it has been observed by some that             36
good regulatory practice should focus on outcomes of regulatory objectives, rather than            
compliance with prescriptive rules, the concern relating to whether compliance is ‘voluntary’            
or ‘involuntary appears to be of irrelevance as long as compliance is ultimately achieved.              
Nevertheless, compliance is vital, hence the need for direct monitoring by the State or              
government. Three fundamental elements exist in implementing responsive regulation. The          37
first of these consists of disapproval which is systematic, fairly directed and explained in its               
entirety. The second element combines such disapproval with a respect for regulatees ,             
whilst the third consists of increased intensification of regulatory response in situations where             
the regulator has tried considerably, but without success, to meet those standards which are              
required. 
 
Traditional Regulation Advantages of Traditional Regulation 
 
Although command and control regulation has been criticized for its rigidity, such rigidity             
having contributed to economic inefficiency, Latin suggests that this approach has           
advantages. Furthermore, these advantages extend beyond those advantages identified         38
with more tailored and flexible instruments.  39
 
- ……”decreased information collection and evaluation costs, greater consistency and           
predictability of results, greater accessibility of decisions to public scrutiny and participation,            
increased likelihood that regulations will withstand judicial review, reduced opportunities for           
manipulative behavior by agencies in response to political or bureaucratic pressures,           
reduced opportunities for obstructive behavior by regulated parties, and decreased likelihood           
of social dislocation and “forum shopping” resulting from competitive disadvantages between           
geographical regions or between firms in regulated industries”.-   40
 
As argued by Gunningham and Grabosky, the ability to define the expected behavior of              
regulatees with immense clarity, constitutes the major strength of command and control            
regulation. Further, not only does this enable breaches of the legal standard and legal              41
enforcement to be identified in a relatively straight forward manner, it defines limits of              
regulators’ operations which enables the firms to have a clearer understanding of their             
regulatory obligations.  42
36 ​See F Haines and D Gurney ‘ Regulatory Compliance: The Problems and Possibilities in Generic Models of                  
Regulation’ in ’Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance’ R Johnstone and R Sarre (eds) (2004) Research and               
Public Policy Series No 57 at page 19; P May and R Burby ‘Making Sense Out of Regulatory Enforcement’ Law                    
and Policy 20 (2) 157-182, J Black ‘Rules and Regulators’ Journal of Law and Society 26 (2) 215-239 (1997) Oxford:                    
Clarendon Press  
37 ​See R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers                 
15/2007 at page 6 , and also J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Restorative Justice (2002) Oxford: Oxford                 
University Press 
38 ​N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : Clarendon 
Press at page 42 
39  ​ibid; also see H Latin ‘Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 
“Fine Tuning” Reforms’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review at page 1271 
40 ibid 
41 ​N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : Clarendon 
Press at page 42 
42 ​ibid at page 41  
 
Addressing the Deficiencies of Traditional Regulation  
 
“Responsive regulation is distinguished (from other strategies of market governance) both in            
what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be”.  43
 
Ayres and Braithwaite also propose that regulation be responsive to industry structure –             
since different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation.             44
According to Baldwin and Black, in order to be “really responsive”, regulators are required to               45
be responsive - not only to the level of compliance of the regulatee, but also to the                 
frameworks within the firms – both operating and cognitive, to the environment which             
encompasses the regulatory regime, which is broader and institutional, to the different ways             
whereby regulatory tools and strategies operate, to the performance of the regime and             
ultimately, to changes which exist within each of the mentioned elements. Regulation, it is              
argued, is responsive when it knows its regulatees and its environments, when it is capable               
of coherently organizing different and new regulatory modes of reasoning, when it is sensitive              
to performance and when it recognizes what its changing challenges are. Baldwin and             46
Black’s opinion of what is really responsive would have to take into consideration the growing               
impact of risk.  47
 
Gunningham advances the argument that the deployment of a range of regulatory actors to              
implement combinations of “policy instruments”, which are tailored to individual goals and            
circumstances, will generate more effective and efficient policy outcomes and that this            
approach should reduce the regulatory burden on government, thereby liberating scarce           
resources for apportionment to those areas which are in greatest need of government             
intervention. Greater focus is also placed on the ability of second and third parties - be it                 48
business, commercial or non commercial third parties- to act as quasi regulators who would              
complement or act as substitutes for government regulation in particular situations.           49
Proposals are advanced whereby a set of principles and policy prescriptions can be             
designed to achieve a “regulatory mix”.  50
 
Self regulation, co regulation and meta regulation Self regulation and Co regulation 
 
The exercise of control, by a group of firms or individuals, over its membership and their                
behaviour can be considered as self-regulation. Variables of self regulation consist of the             51
43 ​Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation p 4 
44 ​ibid 
45 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at pages 3 and 4  
46 ​ibid 
47 ​See M Ojo ‘The Growing Importance of Risk in Regulation’​ Journal of Risk Finance Vol 11 Issue 3 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/15265941011043639 
48 ​N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : Clarendon 
Press at page 15 
49 ​ibid 
50 ​See ibid at page 19 
51 ​See R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University 
Press at page 125 
governmental nature of self-regulation, the level of involvement of self regulators and the             
extent of the binding legal force which is connected to self-regulatory rules. Claims in favour               52
of self regulation or the incorporation of components of self regulation into governmental             
regulation are based on arguments related to expertise and efficiency.   53
 
“Coregulation, as distinct from enforced self-regulation, is usually taken to mean industry            
association self-regulation with some oversight and/or ratification by government.” It is           54
distinguished from enforced self regulation in that with enforced self regulation, negotiations            
which are aimed at establishing regulations that are tailor made to each firm, take place               
between the state and individual firms.   55
 
 
Meta Regulation Why Meta Regulation Could Be the Most Responsive Form of Regulation 
 
Regulation may be regarded as a response to risk and the control of risks can be                56
considered to be the main concern of regulation. “The regulatory state is becoming a risk               57
management state”. Ulrich Beck argues that whilst the standard way of risk regulation in              58
modern societies was well suited for such societies, it is not responsive enough to our “post                
modern” societies.   59
 
52 ​ibid at pages 125 and 126  
53 ​ibid at page 126; In relation to expertise, it is usually advanced that self-regulatory bodies possess greater                  
expertise than is the case with independent regulation. Efficiency is also a ground put forward by proponents of                  
self regulation in that self regulation emphasizes the ability of self regulation to generate controls in an efficient                  
manner – since there is greater accessibility to those being controlled. Furthermore, self regulators are able to                 
acquire information at lower costs, incur low monitoring and enforcement costs and can easily adapt their                
regimes to changing industrial conditions; ibid at page 127. 
54 ​P Grabosky and J Braithwaite,. Of Manners Gentle; Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory 
Agencies, (1986) Oxford University Press, Melbourne at page 83 
55 ​See also I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995)               
Oxford: Social Legal Studies at page 101 and R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory,                
Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University Press at pages 125-127 
56 ​U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications ; also see C Hood, H 
Rothstein and R Baldwin The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk (2001) Oxford University Press 
57 ​R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University 
Press at page 138 
58 ​M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty 2004 Demos at page 23 
and also see B Fischoff, SR Watson and C Hope ‘ Defining Risk’ Policy Sciences 17 (1984)  
59 ​See U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications and also M Lassagne                  
and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and Strategic               
Management’ see< http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf> (last visited 17th March       
2009) According to Ulrich Beck and other sociologists’ considerations of the “risk society”, nature does not play                 
a role in generating risks in the sense that risks are no longer the consequence of external or uncontrollable                   
factors such as “force majeure” but are generated through man made decisions. Cultural theorists however, argue                
that attitudes to risk differ according to cultural preferences. See R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding                
Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University Press at page 141. Also see M Douglas Risk                 
and Blame (1992) London  
Risk is, as a result, inefficiently controlled at too high a cost. Recent years have witnessed                60
growing acceptance of the fact that the efficiency of regulation will be enhanced where a               
collaboration with private control systems exists. By utilising activities which relate to private             61
internal control systems for purposes which are of public regulatory nature, regulators are not              
only able to relieve themselves of the cumbersome work which derives from rule making, but               
are also able to concentrate on the oversight of the functioning and design of local systems.                62
‘Enforced self regulation’, ‘regulated self-regulation’ and ‘meta regulation’ are various forms           
which a responsive model may assume and such a model assigns a central role to internal                
control systems.   63
 
Basel II bank regulation reforms constitute an example of meta regulation. Meta regulation is              
referred to as the regulation of self regulation whilst meta risk management implies the risk               64
management of risk management. Traditionally risk management, to a large extent, has            
focused on complying with current rules. It has great potential especially in situations where              65
risks are volatile and where the regulator is not in a position to comprehend such risks.                66
However maximum realisation of such potential can only occur only where such risks are              
within the control of an enterprise where the regulator holds an influential position. As was               67
mentioned in the above paragraph, over the years, there has been a trend towards greater               
regulation of business management processes and strategies of regulated firms through           
regulatory tools which address the role of senior managements of firms and directly regulate              
individuals within firms.   68
 
According to Fiona Haynes, meta regulation “with its collaborative approach to rule            69
generation”, could controversially be considered to be the approach with greatest evolvement            
when considered in relation to other approaches such as co-regulation, enforced self            
regulation and process or management-based regulation. Meta regulation is a method which            
is capable of managing “self regulatory capacity” within those sites being regulated whilst             
exercising governmental discretion in stipulating the goals and levels of risk reduction to be              
achieved in regulation. Processes and procedures for risk management are developed, not            70
60 ​It can be observed from daily occurrence that more attention should be devoted to recent evolution toward                  
risk based regulation, examples of which can be found in recent European and partly Western-rule setting as                 
illustrated by the Basel II agreement on the regulation of risks in banking and the European Commission White                  
Paper on how to regulate risk in the chemical industry. For more information on this, see M Lassagne and B                    
Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and Strategic Management’              
(last visited 16th May 2015)  
61 ​M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty 2004 Demos at page 21. 
62 ibid 
63 i​bid; Also see E Rosa, ‘Meta Theoretical Foundations For Post Normal Risk’ Journal of Risk Research 1 (1998) 
64 ​See the penultimate chapter of Christine Parker’s book, C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self 
Regulation and Democracy. 2002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
65 ​M Lassagne and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and                 
Strategic Management’ see http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf (last visited 16th       
May 2015) 
66 ​J Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Governance Paper to Risk Regulation, Accountability              
and Development Conference, University of Manchester, 26-27 June 2003 at page 1 
67 ​ibid 
68 ​J Gray and J Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2006 at page 2 
69 ​F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39 at page 3 
70 ​ibid at page 1  
only by key stakeholders, but also by personnel within these organisations. This takes place              71
whilst ensuring that “pro-compliance motivational postures” are generated within the site           
being regulated such that the goal of the regulator, that is, risk reduction, is achieved. The                72
success of the implementation of meta regulation is based on the regulator and regulated              
organisation’s understanding of risk priorities in the same manner.   73
 
 
 
Meta regulation is advantageous particularly where there are complex causes of harm, which             
also require constant monitoring. However, problems related to enforcement exist. Legal           74
and General Assurance Society v FSA highlighted how the more holistic focus which meta              
regulation has on systemic failures on the part of firms, rather than their specific acts or                
omissions, is starting to influence the ways of approaching issues of causation in the              
framework of regulatory responsibility. The increasing popularity of internal control systems           
has been an express feature of risk management. Primary or real risks are translated by               75 76
internal control systems into systems risks such as early warning mechanisms and            
compliance violation alerts. As a result, many risks are capable of being and are being               77
“operationalised” as organisational processes of control. Such transformation is a          78
prerequisite for the feasibility of risk based regulation – which will be discussed in the final                
section of this article. Enforced Self Regulation envisions that in particular situations, it will              79
be more efficacious for the regulated firms to take on some or all of the legislative, executive                 
and judicial regulatory functions.   80
 
Ayres and Braithwaite however stress that whatever particular regulatory functions should be            
“sub contracted” to the regulated firms would be dependent on the industry’s structure and              
historical performance and that delegation of legislative functions need not imply delegation of             
executive functions. The issue of monitoring is crucial in the model of Enforced             
Self-Regulation. In achieving the right mix of regulatory strategies, the right reallocation of             
regulatory resources would be important. Direct government monitoring would still be           81
necessary for firms too small to afford their own compliance groups. State involvement             82
would not stop at monitoring as violations of the privately written and publicly ratified rules               
would be punishable by law. Ayres and Braithwaite demonstrate that Enforced           83
71 ​ibid at page 3; Also see C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self- Regulation and Democracy. 2002 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
72 i​bid  
73 ​F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39  at page 17 
74 ​ibid at page 1  
75 M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty 2004 Demos at page 24  
76 ​Primary risks, for example financial loss are distinguished from secondary risk (reputational risk) see ibid at 
page 32 
77 ibid at page 24  
78  ​ibid  
79 ​ibid 
80 ​Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation p 103  
81 ​I Ayres and J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate ( New York: Oxford 
Union Press 1992) 129  
82 ​Ibid p 106  
83 ​ibid 
Self-Regulation might produce simple specific rules that would make possible both more            
efficient, comparable accounting and easier conviction of violators. Good regulatory policy           84
could therefore be said to constitute an acceptance of the inevitability of some sort of               
symbiosis between state regulation and self regulation.   85
 
According to Rose – Ackerman (1988), good regulatory policy should be a combination of              86
self – regulation and state regulation. Issue relates to what proportion of self-regulation or              
state regulation should make up a good regulatory policy. This is of vital importance as proper                
delegation of a certain percentage of responsibilities to the state and individual institutions             
would reduce many of the disadvantages of the Enforced Self Regulation Model.  
 
Ayres and Braithwaite also argue that good policy analysis is not about choosing between              87
the free market and government regulation nor deciding what the law should prescribe. They              
suggest that an understanding of private regulation, its interdependence with state regulation            
is required to achieve the mix of private and public regulation. Achieving the right mix of                
private and public regulation is one of the greatest challenges in designing a good regulatory               
policy.  
 
Ayres and Braithwaite contend that there is no such thing as an optimal regulatory strategy               88
and that there are just different strategies that have a mix of strengths and weaknesses. They                
go on to say that the appropriateness of a particular strategy depends on the legal,               
constitutional and cultural context and history of its invocation. Gunningham and Sinclair            89
propose two vital components of a successful regulatory design namely, regulatory design            
principles and instrument mixes. Regulatory processes are classified into four namely:           90 91 92
Identification of the desired policy goal(s) and tradeoffs necessary to achieve it, identification             
of the unique characteristics of problem being addressed, identification of the range of             
potential regulatory participants and policy instruments and identification of opportunities for           
consultation and public participation.  
 
 
Regulatory principles are classified into five namely: Prefer policy mixes incorporating a            93
broader range of instruments and institutions, prefer less interventionist measures which           
84 ​C Hadjiemmanuil, 'Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: A Trend Towards Mega regulators, United              
Kingdom: Full Consolidation as a Response to the Inefficiencies of Fragmentation' p 109  
85 ​ I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation : Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford Union 
Press 1992) 3  
86 ibid 
87 ​ibid 
88  ​Ibid at p 101 
89 ​See concluding chapter ‘Designing Environmental Policy’ by N Cunningham and D Sinclair in N Gunningham                
and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : Clarendon Pres​s 
90  ​ibid at pages 387-419 
91  ibid at pages 422- 448 
92  see ibid at pages 378-385 
93 ​See N. Gunningham, & P. Grabosky, (1998). Smart Regulation. Designing Environmental Policy. New York:               
Oxford University Press.  
and N. Gunningham, & D. Sinclair, (1999). Designing Smart Regulation. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/39/           
33947759.pdf 
include the principle of low interventionism, ascending a dynamic instrument pyramid to the             
level required to achieve policy goals – including building in regulatory responsiveness,            
empowering participants which are best placed to act as quasi regulators – including the              
application of the principle of empowerment and maximizing opportunities for win-win           
outcomes – including the consideration of whether firms will voluntarily go beyond            
compliance. Instrument mixes are broadly classified into those which involve inherently           94
complementary activities, inherently counter productive instrument combinations,       95
sequencing instrument combinations, combinations where outcome will be context specific          96
and multi instrument mixes.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The transformation of internal control into risk management can be attributed to an             
increasingly volatile financial environment and the emergence of complex financial products           
(for example, derivatives). Whilst such factors necessitate the need for risk management,            
several consequences emanate from an excessive operation of risk management, namely:           97
Reliance on internal controls may increase risk if it leads to an undermining of the knowledge                
of risk in other areas; despite the benefits of risk management, concerns are generated due               
to the fact that secondary risk management has become an accepted “organisational            
common sense” - reflecting the society’s loss in faith in its professions and public              98
organisations.   99
 
According to Baldwin and Cave, the first regulatory challenge faced by regulators consists in              
the identification of risks that need to be reduced – not only on the basis of priority, but also in                    
a way which would be approved by the public. Secondly, regulators are confronted with the               100
challenge of managing and regulating risks in a way which is both effective and acceptable.               101
Furthermore, the design of institutions and techniques for managing risk, the choice of the              
appropriate regulatory technique, issues relating to whether risk management or regulation           
94 ​ibid 
95 ​These include voluntarism and command and control regulation, self-regulation and command and control,              
command and control regulation (or self regulation) and supply side incentives, command and control (or self                
regulation) and broad based economic instruments (which target different aspects of a common problem), liability               
rules and command and control (or self regulation) 
96 T​hese include self regulation and sequential command and control, self regulation and sequential broad based                
economic instruments  
97 ​R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers                
15/2007 at pages 50- 58; “Soft management systems” which are able to address uncertainties need to be designed                  
and a balance should be struck between the role of calculative methods and other softer forms such as images                   
and normative. 
98 ​See also D Marquand, The Decline of the Public Cambridge: Polity Press 2004 
99 The close association between organizational governance and risk management exacerbates this position.              
Furthermore, Power argues that to move beyond such “risk management driven privatization of the public               
sphere”, a new idea of risk which incorporates types of leadership at state, regulatory and corporate levels, and                  
which is able to develop a language of risk, understood by the public and which expressly allows for the                   
possibility of failure without this being understood as a way of “passing the buck”, will be required, see M                   
Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty 2004 Demos at pages 57 and                 
58  
100 ​R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University               
Press at pages 142 and 143 
101 ​ibid at 143 
should be “blame oriented” and the contentious topic of reliance by risk managers on              
qualitative risk evaluations in contrast to more quantitative methods of assessments           
constitutes additional challenges. In spite of the above mentioned consequences and           102
challenges, the ability of responsive regulation to address such a complex factor as risk, its               103
flexibility and responsiveness to regulatees and its environment among other advantages,           
make it a more desirable regulatory tool than traditional regulation or risk based regulation.  
 
Whilst direct monitoring by the State would be required, the involvement of third parties such               
as non government organisations would also be crucial to ensuring that a situation, whereby              
the State could be captured, is avoided. Furthermore the possibilities available in achieving             
the right “regulatory mix” make it a promising regulatory tool. Even though the contested              
nature of risk contributes to the difficulty of relying on risk as a regulatory tool, its presence                 
and ever growing significance cannot be ignored – hence the need for a form of regulation                
which is able to manage risk more effectively and which would best suit an evolving               
regulatory environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 ​ibid at 144  
103 ​According to Baldwin and Cave, risk regulators encounter problems with the search for legitimation as a result                  
of differences between the lay and experts’ perceptions of risk. For additional information on what could be done                  
to improve the effect of legitimating arguments and solutions advanced to counter problems of risk regulation,                
see R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University               
Press at pages 145 –149. For problems with defining and assessing risk, see page 138 ibid 
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